Washington DC – Since normalizing their bilateral relations a little over a year ago, it seems like Madrid and Rabat are experiencing one of their best phases since Morocco’s independence in 1956. One of the biggest obstacles standing in the way of Moroccan-Spanish relations was lifted last year with Spain’s historic decision to recognize the Moroccan autonomy plan as the best route to a lasting settlement of the Sahara dispute.
While it is true that the issue of Ceuta and Melilla remains unresolved, the governments of both countries seem to have acquired enough resilience and political maturity to keep it under control. Since the Barajas meeting between King Hassan II and General Franco in July 1963, Morocco and Spain appear to have managed to settle on a modus operandi that has allowed them to reduce the impact of this dispute on their overall bilateral relations.
Typically, Morocco has only raised the issue when faced with Spain’s reluctance to support the Moroccan stance on the Sahara dispute. And whenever Spain showed signs of support for the Moroccan position, Rabat would almost instantly put its territorial claims on Ceuta and Melilla on the back burner.
The cordiality that characterized the high-level Morocco-Spain meeting held in Rabat last February and the large delegation that accompanied Pedro Sanchez, head of the Spanish government, highlighted both countries’ readiness to give a new impetus to their diplomatic relations.
In this sense, Morocco’s bid to co-host the 2030 World Cup with Spain and Portugal was the icing on the cake of a newfound friendship, demonstrating the level of trust that now reigns in the relations between Rabat and Madrid. Even more striking is the fact that the announcement of Morocco joining the bid with Spain and Portugal did not come from the Spanish government, the major sponsor of this bid, but from Morocco.
This clearly proves that Spain no longer treats Morocco as a minor partner, but as a major ally whose friendship is invaluable for Madrid’s foreign policy and its strategic interests, both economically and security-related. Moreover, the fact that the announcement of the joint bid came from Morocco also means that the country will not be assigned a secondary role in the eventual co-organization of the World Cup.
Who would have dared to think four or five years ago, let alone when Morocco and Spain endured their biggest diplomatic crisis, that the two countries would end up bidding jointly to host the World Cup with Portugal? So this fact alone reveals the level of mutual trust that now exists between the two capitals.
Organizing the World Cup requires long and arduous efforts, from convincing the national federations to vote for the best bid to building or renovating infrastructure, as well as setting up the security arrangements to host the event itself.
Beyond the mutual trust needed to co-host such a prestigious event, the decision to co-organize suggests that each side is determined to spare no effort to immunize their relations against any friction that may occasionally arise in the course of their partnership to successfully host the world’s leading footballing event.
In particular, Morocco would not have joined the Spanish-Portugal bid if the upper echelons of Moroccan power were not certain that the cyclical political changes that occur every four years in the Spanish political landscape will not affect Madrid’s position on the Sahara.
On the other hand, Spain would not have been enthusiastic about presenting its bid with Morocco if it did not trust Rabat’s sincere desire to open a new chapter in bilateral relations, to give new impetus to the cooperation and coordination between the two countries to address the common challenges and threats they face, as well as to make the most of the synergy of their economies with a view to creating a common space of prosperity and stability in the Mediterranean.
It could therefore be argued that we are witnessing the birth of a real strategic Rabat-Madrid axis, whose greatest collateral victim is France. In other words, Morocco’s decision to present its bid for the 2030 World Cup with Spain and Portugal was yet another subtle message to France.
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This implicit message from Rabat to Paris is that the time for favors is over and that Rabat has chosen its position in its Mediterranean neighborhood. As such, there is no doubt, should the joint Morocco-Portugal-Spain bid win the rights to host the 2030 World Cup, that Morocco will favor Spanish companies in the large infrastructure projects that it will launch in preparation for co-hosting the global tournament.
To state the blindingly obvious, France’s image and credibility as Morocco’s leading partner has spectacularly weakened over the past two to three years. France’s refusal to join Spain and the US in expressing unequivocal support for Morocco’s sovereignty over the Sahara will undoubtedly have disastrous repercussions for French interests in the kingdom. Anti-French sentiment has been spreading throughout the country, and more voices are heard every day calling on the Moroccan government to replace French with English in Moroccan schools.
The Western Sahara issue “is the prism through which Morocco views its international environment,” King Mohammed VI memorably said in a speech on August 20 of last year. The King’s central point was that unequivocal support for Morocco’s sovereignty over its southern provinces is the ultimate “measure for the sincerity of friendships” between Morocco and its partners.
Spain has heeded the message and taken a decisive step to consolidate its position as Morocco’s first economic partner, but France remains trapped in a very outdated assessment of its relations with Morocco. While this strategic blunder has already cost Paris dearly in terms of its economic and strategic interests, it could cost the European country even more in the mid and long terms.
Source: moroccoworldnews
